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Editorial
Introduction to Special Theme
Veillance and transparency: A critical
examination of mutual watching in the
post-Snowden, Big Data era
Vian Bakir1, Martina Feilzer2 and Andrew McStay1
Abstract
Introducing the Special Theme on Veillance and Transparency: A Critical Examination of Mutual Watching in the Post-Snowden,
Big Data Era, this article presents a series of provocations and practices on veillance and transparency in the context of
Big Data in a post-Snowden period. In introducing the theoretical and empirical research papers, artistic, activist and
educational provocations and commentaries in this Special Theme, it highlights three central debates. Firstly, concerning
theory/practice, it queries how useful theories of veillance and transparency are in explaining mutual watching in the
post-Snowden, Big Data era. Secondly, it presents a range of questions concerning norms, ethics, regulation, resistance
and social change around veillance and transparency. Thirdly, it interrogates the upsurge in veillance and transparency
discourses and practices post-Snowden, and asks whether they are adequate to the task of educating and engaging
people on abstract and secretive surveillance practices, as well as on the possibilities and pitfalls of sousveillance.
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Provocations and practices on veillance
and transparency
Veillance is Steve Mann’s (2013) term for processes of
mutual watching and monitoring by surveillant organ-
izations and sousveillant individuals. Surveillance
involves monitoring from a position of political or com-
mercial power by those who are not a participant to the
activity being watched (for instance, CCTV cameras,
undercover policing, sentiment analysis and program-
matic tools used by marketing companies and intelli-
gence agencies). By contrast, sousveillance (Mann,
2005) involves monitoring from a position of minimal
power, and by those who are participating in the activ-
ity being watched or sensed. Sousveillance takes several
forms. Personal sousveillance is a form of watching
without political or legal intent (such as sharing selfies,
life-logging and using wearables). Hierarchical sousveil-
lance has political or legal intent targeted at the power-
ful (such as when protesters use their smartphone
videos and social media to monitor police at demon-
strations, or when insider whistle-blowers leak incrimi-
nating documents). The past decade has seen an
intensification of veillant forces from all quarters
(state, commercial, civil society, citizens), leading to
questions of whether it is possible, or desirable, to
resist being watched. Accepting the inevitability of sur-
veillance, and the rapid growth of sousveillance, Mann
(2013) envisages a state of equiveillance, where there is
equality between surveillant and sousveillant forces,
leading to a transparent society. While a balanced con-
dition of mutual watching may be unrealisable in
1School of Creative Studies and Media, Bangor University, Bangor, UK
2School of Social Sciences, Bangor University, Bangor, UK
Corresponding author:
Vian Bakir, College of Arts and Humanities, Bangor University, JP Building,
Bangor LL57 2DG, UK.
Email: v.bakir@bangor.ac.uk
Big Data & Society
January–June 2017: 1–5





Creative Commons CC-BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further
permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-
at-sage).
practice, this Special Theme critically examines a range
of veillant forces, resistances and tensions, seeking to
understand these operations in the context of Big Data
in a post-Snowden period.
In June 2013, the leaks by national security whistle-
blower, Edward Snowden, exposed governments’ secret
mass surveillance of ordinary citizens’ digital footprints
in multiple liberal democracies. The leaks revealed that
signals intelligence agencies such as the USA’s National
Security Agency (NSA) and the UK’s Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) collect data
in bulk from the servers of US global telecommunica-
tions companies, compelling them to secretly hand over
this data; and that intelligence agencies secretly tap
fibre-optic cables carrying internet traffic. The data
intercepted and collected includes the content of com-
munications (such as emails, instant messages and full
web browsing histories); and metadata information
about the communication (for instance, who the com-
munication is from and to whom; from where it is sent,
and to where; the record of web domains visited; and
mobile phone location data). These disparate data
streams, which can be acted upon in real time and/or
stored for subsequent analysis (GCHQ, 2012; NSA,
2001), reveal much about a person’s actions, thoughts
and intentions. Use of Big Data analytics is also
common in commercial organisations to better target
advertising and marketing content. However, while
intelligence and security agencies seek to identify crim-
inals and pre-empt specific threats thereby making indi-
vidual identification a key goal, commercial entities
often try to avoid identifying people so as not to fall
foul of privacy regulations, instead using analytics to
deliver insights into groups of similar people rather
than individuals (McStay, 2017).
These security and commercial practices lead us to
suggest: through various veillant forces, we live in a
techno-cultural condition of increased transparency. As
cultural philosophers observe, transparency takes vari-
ous forms (Bakir and McStay, 2015; Birchall, 2014;
McStay, 2014; Vattimo, 1992). Historically, transpar-
ency has been a liberal principle. As explored in McStay
(2014), it is an enlightenment norm advocating
accountability and public inspection of state power
(Mill, 1962 [1859]), an exemplar being journalism
acting as the Fourth Estate. In modern terms, this
transparency arrangement also holds that law-abiding
citizens should be able to exercise personal choice/con-
trol over their own visibility to real or machinic others.
Related, Bentham advocates transparency of both
public and private processes for the general good, pro-
posing that, ‘Every gesture, every turn of limb or fea-
ture, in those whose motions have a visible impact on
the general happiness, will be noticed and marked
down’ (1834: 101). The impact of this more radical
transparency arrangement is that, as these are socially
or legally agreed norms, citizens have low individual
control over their own personal visibility. Forced trans-
parency is the pre-Snowden condition of surveillance
that secretly demands high visibility of citizens to maxi-
mise the greater good of national security. Unlike a
radical transparency arrangement, forced transparency
largely operates without citizens’ knowledge or consent,
nor with sufficient oversight of surveillant entities to
win social trust.
Our key debates
Through multiple veillant forces, we clearly live in a
techno-cultural condition of increased transparency,
but what is less clear are the wider implications. As
such, we have assembled theoretical and empirical
research papers, artistic, activist and educational
provocations and commentary to explore three sets of
questions that we posed to contributors.
1. Theory-practice
How useful are theories of veillance and transparency
in explaining mutual watching in the post-Snowden, ‘Big
Data’ era? Accepting the inevitability of surveillance,
Mann and Ferenbok (2013: 26) seek to counter-balance
surveillance by increasing sousveillant oversight from
below (‘undersight’) facilitated through civic and tech-
nology practices such as better whistle-blower protec-
tion, public debate, participatory projects and systems
innovations. Once this balance is achieved, they suggest
that such a society is both equiveillant and transparent.
But can more sousveillance really counter-balance sur-
veillance? What about reincorporation of sousveillant
data by surveillant practices? Is it possible to resist
veillant forces in contemporary digital societies? Does
the answer lie in counterveillance, Mann’s (2013) term
for blocking both surveillance and sousveillance? Does
the answer lie in univeillance (Mann, 2013) where sur-
veillance is blocked but sousveillance is enabled (exem-
plified by default encryption adopted by technology
corporations post-Snowden)? Our Special Theme’s
research papers respond to veillance theories in differ-
ent ways.
Dan McQuillan’s analysis of algorithmic paranoia
dismisses Mann’s concept of veillance as the wrong
sort of metaphor for the forms of seeing introduced
by Big Data algorithms. McQuillan observes that the
data produced by machines is most often ‘seen’ by
other machines in order to find correlations to enable
prediction in financial, social or security risk situations;
and that this seeing reproduces the prejudices of its
input. For McQuillan, this induces a psychological
state of algorithmic paranoia that, if it is to be
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challenged, requires that we change how we see (rather
than, for instance, blocking certain types of veillance);
and that this demands critical work on algorithms to
minimise algorithmic prejudices.
Other research papers in this Special Theme adapt
the veillance metaphor to explore specific variants of
mutual watching. Critiquing the idea that equiveillance
captures our contemporary condition of mutual watch-
ing, Clare Birchall advances the notion of shareveillance
in her discussion of subjectivity, open data (that gov-
ernments willingly share with citizens) and closed data
(such as that collected by intelligence agencies). For
Birchall, the contemporary condition of mutual watch-
ing is not an evenly poised balance between surveillant
and sousveillant forces. Rather, we are in a state of
shareveillance: an ‘anti-politicised role the datafied neo-
liberal security state imagines for its public; the latter is
configured more as either a flat dataset or a series of
individual auditor–entrepreneurs than as a force with
political potential’. To challenge this state of affairs, she
offers suggestions for how data sharing could be more
ethically distributed, and unpacks what citizens’ ‘right
to opacity’ might mean in the digital context.
Focusing on the pre-crime assemblage – an auto-
mated, fluid disciplinary space designed to modify
and monetise human behaviour to pre-empt harmful
futures – Peter Mantello advances the notion of ikea-
veillance: ‘a do-it-yourself, voluntary opt-in approach
to algorithmic governance’ that contributes to the
pre-crime assemblage. Examining case studies from
the USA, Australia and Japan, he concludes that the
masses, rather than seeking resistance, are complicit in
voluntarily trading privacy or sacrificing anonymity for
product discounts, benefits and services, or to self-
enhance notions of civic-minded servitude.
Piro Rexhepi’s Early Career Researcher essay sees
Big Data surveillance as tantamount to what she
terms sur/violence (for instance, drone strikes killing
people via metadata identification). By focusing on per-
ipheral political spaces, Rexhapi queries the ability of
sousveillance to destabilise and disrupt sur/violence. In
the periphery, surveillance is not framed by middle class
concerns over privacy, democracy and civil society, but
is a matter of life and death.
2. Norms, ethics, regulation, resistance and social
change
Are existing mechanisms of regulation and oversight
able to deal with the security states’ practices of forced
transparency, and corporations’ drive to maximise data
collection for commercial gain, or is resistance required
from other quarters? How healthy are current sousveil-
lant civic and technology practices, and where do they
need strengthening? What, if anything, can or should
we do about practices of watching that operate without
informed consent or adequate processes of
accountability?
Anthony Mills and Katherine Sarikakis address
these questions through the lens of investigative jour-
nalism. They argue that legislative change towards
stronger state surveillance across multiple countries dis-
rupts the preconditions for a strong democracy based
on free media and free citizens. Their examination of
journalists’ experiences with surveillance in non-
Western and Western countries finds that investigative
journalists have been intimidated through surveillance;
but that they fight back through often-fraught cooper-
ation with hacktivists, and through self-directed protec-
tion of communications and sources.
Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz and Jonathan Cable
address these questions through the lens of British
social justice activists. They find that their resistance
to state surveillance largely takes shape in techno-
legal responses to encryption, and policy advocacy
around privacy and data protection. They find this
problematic because of activists’ ambiguity around
technological resistance strategies, with critical
responses to Snowden’s leaks largely confined to
expert communities. Introducing the notion of data
justice, they suggest that resistance to surveillance
needs to be reconceptualised and connected to broader
social justice agendas.
Focussing on advertising and the net rise in empathic
media (namely, technologies that track bodies and react
to emotions and intentions), Andrew McStay advances
the notion of emotiveillance: the use of biometrically
sensitive technologies to infer peoples’ emotions.
McStay examines the use of biofeedback in advertising,
both for in-house emotion detection of responses to
adverts, and for digital out-of-home advertising that
reacts to peoples’ emotional expressions. Through
survey work, he finds that few British citizens are com-
fortable with having data about their emotional state
linked with personal information. Setting this insight
against industry practices that claim not to use personal
data, he argues that rather than fixating on privacy
invasions based on identification, regulators and self-
regulators should attend to the principle of intimacy, as
this is a core characteristic of data about emotions.
Focusing on regulations and rights, Yvonne
McDermott-Rees’ commentary observes that the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union entered into force in 2009. This created a funda-
mental right to data protection, standing as distinct to
the right to privacy. In examining this new and unique
right to data protection, she posits that its underpin-
ning principles reflect key European legal values,
namely: privacy, transparency, autonomy and
non-discrimination. She notes the challenges in
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implementing this right in an era of ubiquitous veillance
practices and Big Data. These include the volume of
data on the self that is ‘volunteered’ by others, such
as via social media, which means that a consent-based
model cannot ensure protection of one’s data; and find-
ing the balance between the security state’s dataveil-
lance and the right to data protection.
3. Representation, discourse and public understanding
Snowden’s leaks provoked libertarian pro-privacy
discourses and practices: encryption software, courses
in how to use these, and encrypted consumer technol-
ogies have proliferated. The leaks also provoked dis-
courses and practices concerning public accountability
of intelligence agencies. Arguments were made for
greater transparency of regulation concerning intelli-
gence agencies’ surveillant powers, and for translus-
cency rather than transparency to reveal the general
shape of the state’s secrets rather than their details.
These discourses have manifested in multiple sites
including investigative journalism (for instance, The
Guardian, The Intercept), documentaries (Laura
Poitras’ (2014) CitizenFour), feature films (Oliver
Stone’s (2016) Snowden), think tank reports (Simcox,
2015), internet and technology firms’ promoting their
privacy-enhancing technologies and lobbying for legis-
lative change on bulk data collection and transparency
(The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
2014), public reports and statements by intelligence
agencies and their official oversight bodies (Clapper,
2013; Intelligence and Security Committee, 2015), and
NGOs’ representations as a wide range of civil liberties,
human rights, privacy, transparency and press freedom
groups were consulted by post-Snowden surveillance
review boards (Bakir, 2015). While we have seen an
upsurge in veillance and transparency discourses and
practices post-Snowden, how do they position the sur/
sous/veillant subject; and are they adequate to the task of
educating and engaging people on abstract and secretive
surveillance practices, as well as on the possibilities and
pitfalls of sousveillance? These questions are addressed
in our commentaries by people at the coal-face –
educators, artists, engineers and legal experts (the cate-
gories overlap).
Evan Light’s Snowden Archive-in-a-Box is an offline
wireless network and web server providing private
access to a replica of the Snowden Digital Surveillance
Archive – a digital archive that hosts all the published
leaked documents from Snowden as well as the news-
paper articles that published the leaks (2013–2015).
Light explains how Archive-in-a-Box is both a research
tool and a tool for public education on data surveillance.
Derek Curry and Jennifer Gradecki’s interactive art-
work, Crowd-Sourced Intelligence Agency, innovatively
contributes toward an informed public debate about
large-scale monitoring of open source, social media
data and provides a prototype for counterveillance
and sousveillance tools for citizens. By demonstrating
that what a dataveillance program ‘sees’ when it ‘reads’
social media posts is nothing like what a human being
sees, they aim to create a debate over current dataveil-
lance technologies, and the efficacy and ethics of mass
automated dataveillance.
Benjamin Grosser’s interactive artwork, Tracing
You, includes data provided by Google’s Maps Service
to present a website’s best attempt to see the world
from its visitors’ viewpoints. This makes transparent
the potential visibility of one’s present location, and
gives each site visitor the ability to watch other visitor
‘traces’ in real time. By making its surveillance capacity
and intention overt, this computational surveillance
system provokes questions about how the architecture
of networks affects our own visibility both within and
outside of the network.
Yuwei Lin ‘s commentary reflects on her experiences
of teaching privacy and surveillance to media arts prac-
tice university students in the UK. Reflecting on the
creative media practices, attitudes and behaviours of
her students, her commentary raises questions about
the role educators play in enriching public engagement
with critical thinking about Big Data.
Ben Brucato’s commentary on Big Data, transpar-
ency and measuring and representing killings by the
US police notes that there are few national, longitu-
dinal studies or records of police use of force. This
perceived lack of transparency amplifies concerns that
many of these killings are unjustified and signals a
deliberate avoidance of accountability. He considers
efforts by journalists and activists to construct data-
bases that document and measure police violence, par-
ticularly in terms of how they exemplify the new
transparency.
Last but not least, Steve Mann’s commentary draws
our attention to the need for bottom-up transparency in
computer engineering, arguing that scientists have the
right and responsibility to be able to understand the
instruments that they use to make their discoveries.
He posits that veillance is important not just in
human–human interaction (such as people watching
other people) but also in terms of Human–Computer
Interaction. Advancing the idea that ‘‘‘Little Data’’ is
to sousveillance (undersight) as ‘‘Big Data’’ is to sur-
veillance (oversight)’, he suggests that we need
Sousveillant Systems, namely forms of Human–
Computer Interaction in which internal computational
states are made visible to end users, when and if they
wish. He envisages an interim solution (an app called
LUNATIC) by which a virtual personal assistant inter-
acts on our behalf with erratic websites or servers,
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thereby making people aware of the need for
Sousveillant Systems.
To conclude, this Special Theme highlights the
importance of inter- and multi-disciplinary debate on
current forms of mutual watching. We argue that the
veillance field is multi-perspectival and characterised by
tension. To understand contemporary data transpar-
ency by focusing on surveillance alone is to misunder-
stand modern watching, sensing and data analytics,
although it remains to be seen whether we will ever see
Mann’s equiveillance in practice. However, we do not
subscribe to a politics of pessimism, but end by calling
for continued critical, technical, legal, political, educa-
tional and artistic intervention into the veillance field.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial sup-
port for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article: the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
Seminar Series (2014–16), DATA – PSST! Debating &
Assessing Transparency Arrangements: Privacy, Security,
Surveillance, Trust. Grant Ref: ES/M00208X/1.
References
Bakir V (2015) ‘‘Veillant panoptic assemblage’’: Mutual
watching and resistance to mass surveillance after
Snowden. Media and Communication 3(3): 12–25 ( DOI:
10.17645/mac.v3i3.277.
Bakir V and McStay A (2015) Theorising transparency
arrangements: Assessing interdisciplinary academic and
multi-stakeholder positions on transparency in the post-
Snowden leak era. Ethical Space: the International Journal
of Communication 3(1): 24–31.
Bentham J (1834) Deontology. London: Rees, Orme, Brown,
Green and Longman.
Birchall C (2014) Radical transparency? Cultural Studies,
Critical Methodologies 14(1): 77–88.
Clapper J (2013) Official statement. Welcome to IC on the
Record. Available at: https://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
post/58838654347/welcome-to-ic-on-the-record (accessed
3 March 2017).
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (2012)
News. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-
34103.pdf (accessed 3 March 2017).
Intelligence and Security Committee (2015) Privacy and
Security: A Modern and Transparent Legal Framework.
London, UK: House of Commons. Available at: http://
isc.independent.gov.uk/ (accessed 3 March 2017).
Mann S (2005) Sousveillance and cyberglogs. Presence:
Teleoperators & Virtual Environments 14(6): 625–646.
Mann S (2013) Veillance and Reciprocal Transparency:
Surveillance versus Sousveillance, AR Glass, Lifeglogging,
and Wearable Computing. Available at: http://wearcam.
org/veillance/veillance.pdf.
Mann S and Ferenbok J (2013) New media and the power
politics of sousveillance in a surveillance-dominated world.
Surveillance & Society 11(1/2): 18–34.
McStay A (2014) Privacy and Philosophy: New Media and
Affective Protocol. New York, NY: Peter Lang.
McStay A (2017) Privacy and the Media. London: Sage.
Mill JS (1962 [1859]) Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on
Bentham. London: Fontana Press.
National Security Agency (NSA) (2001) Business Records
(BR) FISA – Course Welcome. Available at: https://snow-
denarchive.cjfe.org/greenstone/collect/snowden1/index/
assoc/HASH017d/9ecf019c.dir/doc.pdf (accessed 3 March
2017).
Poitras L (2014) Citizenfour. Praxis Films, Participant Media,
HBO Films.
Simcox R (2015) Surveillance after Snowden: Effective
Espionage in an Age of Transparency. London: The
Henry Jackson Society.
Stone O (Dir.) (2016) Snowden. Open Road Films.
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (2014)
Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted
Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT and on
the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. Available at: https://www.pclob.gov/events/2014/
january23.html (accessed 3 March 2017).
Vattimo G (1992) The Transparent Society. Cambridge, UK:
Polity Press.
This Editorial is an introduction to the special theme on Veillance and Transparency. To see a full list of all
articles in this special theme, please click here: http://bds.sagepub.com/content/veillance-and-transparency.
Bakir et al. 5
